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Abstract 
The primary function of episodic memory is to provide reliable information about reality that 
is essential for surviving and navigating in an environment. The communicative function of 
episodic memory ‘sits on top of’ this basic function but does not, in itself, explain it in its totality 
(but may explain particular aspects such as its sensitivity to source credibility).  
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Full commentary text 
Mahr and Csibra (2017) propose that autonoesis (being aware that one remembers a past event) 
as a core feature of episodic memory developed in order to equip people with epistemic 
authority in communication (i.e. being able to use that fact that one remembers as a claim to 
veridicality). While I emphatically agree that social context is important for understanding 
episodic memory (and Mahr and Csibra provide a convincing analysis of episodic memory 
function in communicative contexts), I do not think that this communicative context has 
produced the crucial features of episodic memory (autonoesis and epistemic generativity, in 
Mahr and Csibra’s analysis).  
 
My main argument is that autonoesis can only grant epistemic authority (in one’s own eyes and 
those of other people) if it reliably signals veridicality. There would be no point of having 
autonoetic awareness, and of using it within a communicative context, if “I remember” didn’t 
mean a thing (for instance, I might ‘remember’ then that I met the Queen yesterday, or went 
cross-country skiing in Finland, when I was actually working in my office). That is, 
communication crucially relies on autonoesis as a cue for veridicality – but is it plausible to 
suggest that communication led to the development of this signal in the first place (as Mahr and 
Csibra seem to do)? In my view, autonoesis and episodic memory as a whole have fundamental 
benefits outside any communicative context, mainly in terms of surviving and navigating in the 
environment. For example, accurately remembering places where food has been found or 
predators have been sighted previously will help an organism to survive, and remembering 
where exactly one has parked the car will save time on the way home. Of course these things 
may be communicated to other people as well, but that doesn’t affect the benefits. Also, while 
some of these benefits might be attained on the basis of mere factual knowledge (i.e., without 
autonoesis), this would be mainly restricted to situations where the environment is predictable 
and therefore an episodic record is not needed. As soon as contingencies vary or are unknown, 
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an episodic record of the environment including autonoesis (“I’m sure I came past this 
building”) is helpful.  
 
The idea that (correspondence to) reality is ‘primary’ and communication ‘secondary’ (as far 
as these terms make sense in a context where communication constitutes a large part of 
reality) is also reflected in a classical social psychological theory, Festinger’s (1954) social 
comparison theory. Applied to memory, this theory would emphasise a relation between 
autonoesis/veridicality and the social/communicative context that complements the 
justification relation highlighted by Mahr and Csibra. Specifically, rather than using 
autonoesis to claim epistemic authority in a communicative context, this context (i.e. other 
people) would be consulted as a source of evidence about reality whenever epistemic 
vigilance does not provide strong enough evidence to trust one’s own episodic recollection 
(i.e. under conditions of uncertainty; see Blank, Walther & Isemann, 2017, for a review).  
 
That is, communication can inform beliefs about past events as much as autonoetic 
remembering can, each under respective circumstances. I have developed this view more 
systematically in Blank (in press). Essentially, and relating to the veridicality theme above, 
people need veridical beliefs about the past, and these depend on both the output of their 
individual memory systems and (perceived) reality constraints that can be inferred from 
general knowledge or communicated through other people. Note in this respect that the 
emphasis here is different from Mahr and Csibra (2017). While I agree that there is a 
reciprocal relation between recollective experiences and beliefs about past events, I take the 
latter to be an integral part of remembering (i.e. arriving at – and often further communicating 
– a believed memory of a past event in a process of conversion; Tulving, 1983; Blank, 2009), 
not a mere inference from it. In fact, even the autonoetic experience itself is subject to 
external influence, as cases of induced false memories clearly illustrate (e.g. repeated 
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visualisation leading to ultimately ‘remembering’ a suggested event; Hyman, Husband & 
Billings, 1995). Simple world knowledge can also provide constraints (e.g. making a mental 
simulation of floating in outer space unlikely to be interpreted as a memory for most people), 
but on the other hand the existence of non-believed memories (Mazzoni, Scoboria & Harvey, 
2010) also demonstrates that autonoesis can occur independently from and sometimes in the 
face of external influence.  
 
In any case, the foregoing illustrates that the reality monitoring involved in autonoesis is often 
an inferential process in which attributes of the recollective experience and external 
knowledge are combined (Johnson, 1988; Johnson, Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993; Lindsay, 
2008), which leads me to my final point. While communication may not have shaped episodic 
memory as much in terms of reality monitoring and autonoesis (i.e. in terms of basic 
attributions to past reality), it may have played a more decisive role in source monitoring, that 
is, in attributions to particular social sources of information (mostly people but also media 
etc.). Inasmuch as input from other people is used to inform beliefs about the past, being able 
to reliable identify the sources of this information is crucial for epistemic vigilance, such that 
greater (delegated) epistemic authority can be claimed for memories of past events that are 
informed by the testimony of credible others. As such testimony will mostly be obtained 
through communication, it seems very plausible that this function will have contributed to the 
development of such source monitoring processes.  
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